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During the last thirty years, Korean society has experienced a significant
increase in the role, influence, responsibility, and expertise of the military. The role
and contribution of the military has been extensive for the nation-building of the
newly independent country, the maintenance of national security, economic and
social development, and to the cultivation of nationalism and national spirit.
Even though the military is composed of all strata of society and contains the
same ideology and values as the civilian population, there still exists a
communication and understanding gap between the military and civilian population.
In order to decrease this gap and enhance mutual understanding, the military
must take active effort to improve public relations through an increasing awareness
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I. INTRODUCTION
In many of the new countries that have emerged following World War II, the
military has played a vital role in nation building. As a revolutionary force, various
military groups have contributed to the disintegration of traditional political order; as
a stabilizing force, they have kept countries from falling prey to communist rule;
and as a modernizing force, they have met popular demands for social change and
have provided administrative and technological skills to the civilian sector of
countries in which such skills are scarce.
The Korean armed forces were a longed-for-dream during the 36 years of
Japanese colonial domination (1919-1945) and, as such, embodied the hope for
independence and national sovereignty. Right after liberation from Japanese colonial
rule, the Korean people were required to establish both military and political
institutions at the same time.
From the beginning, the Korean armed forces had to overcome the ideological
clash of the Korean War (1950-1953) and to participate in politics the through
military revolution of 1961. This revolution provided the impetus for progress and
the modernization that followed. Subsequent participation in the Vietnam War
significantly improved the capability of the Korean armed forces and earned their
status as one of the most modem institutions in the country. Among Korean
institutions, the military stands unique. No other cohesive and mature group
approaches its size of some 600,000 men. The military has been subjected to a
consistent discipline and, since the Korean War, to a national educational process.
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No civilian group or institution has come close to it in the development of a
definite and fairly administered career service
The confidence of the Korean military was at work in the Military Revolution
in 1961. The result of the revolution was the establishment of military hegemony
over Korean government and politics. However strong armed forces were unusual
in the context of the past several centuries of Korean history. The 1961 revolution
was the first time in eight hundred years that the military had been cast in a
renovating role.
The role of the Korean military has increased remarkably in Korean society
since 1961. Lovell describes that the enormous capacity of the Republic of Korea
military is influencing almost all aspects of Korean politics [Ref l:p. 25].
The primary mission of any national military force is to provide for the national
security and to be prepared to wage successful battle. In modern society, however,
the military often has the secondary but still vital role of contributing to national
development. In the case of Korea, the military has the double mission of playing
a central role of contributing to the nation's development while also deterring war
from breaking out as a foremost line of defense against the North Korean
Communists.
As Julian Corbett warned, the armed forces must meet whatever changes social
and technological development require, otherwise they will be overturned [Ref. 2:p.
46]. In this connection, this study focuses on surveying the role of the Korean
military in national development as well as on examining the interdependence
between the military and civilian society in Korea. The intent of this study is to
examine how much impact and influence the Korean military has had on national
development and to demonstrate the extent to which the Korean military has
contributed to that development. Also, this study will suggest some ideas for better
civilian-military relations in the future.
II. METHOD OF STUDY AND ORGANIZATION
The basic methodology of this study is descriptive. This methodology involves
the collection and evaluation of facts related to the past. This paper is not a
comparative study nor an attempt at hypothesis testing. This paper evaluates the
contribution of the Korean military organization to the development of the national
development by using the method of specific illustration.
Since the military is one of the biggest consumer groups in Korean society in
peacetime, it is impossible to evaluate comprehensively its productivity or efficiency.
Therefore, this study will be limited to a historical and descriptive approach.
A major problem in assessing the Korean military impact on national
development is limited resources which describe the role of the Korean military
and the contribution to national development. Furthermore, although available, some
classified materials and some sensitive political matters will not be allowed to be
made public.
This study will be organized in the following manner. Chapter III examines
the role of the military as a modernizing agent in the development of some
countries. In many of the nations which were bom shortly after the Second World
War like Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia, the military has played central roles in
nation building. Also in the West, the military has played a important role in
providing technical skills in the process of industrial development. In this context,
this chapter examines the role of the military as a modernizing agents in these
countries.
Chapter TV reviews the Korean military tradition since old dynasties and
describes the history of Korean military from its embryonic stage to becoming one
of the influential groups in Korean society as a result of the success of the military
revolution in 1961.
Chapter V discusses the societal role of the Korean military. In the context of
development, the Korean military stands as the most modern institution. Also, it
has made an enormous contribution to Korean nation building by functioning as a
national educational institute for young recruits throughout the country. This chapter
also deals with the role of the military elite in economic development in the 1960's.
In Chapter VI, contributions of Korean military to the civilian area are discussed.
The military has rendered immense service to the civilian sector in various areas of
Korean society. The Korean military has been successful in contributing to national
development in the following areas: civic support, technical manpower and
development, medical science, and general manpower production The military has
achieved success in these area by using its advanced technical skills, managerial
ability, and its resources. These contributions are specifically illustrated in this
chapter.
And finally Chapter VII suggests some ideas for a better civilian-military
relationship in the future. Despite the immense contributions to the nation by the
Korean military, there has been a rising concern about the status of the military in
Korean society. In this concluding chapter, I'd like to suggest few ideas to enhance
harmony and cooperation between the military and civilian population.
III. THE MILITARY AS MODERNIZING AGENTS
In many of the nations which were born shortly after the Second World War,
Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia for example, the military has played central roles in
nation building. These countries may be considered representatives of the newly
independent nations of South-east Asia. These countries are probably the best
examples in which to observe the military as a modernizing and westernizing
influence.
The Burmese Army, for example, in addition to its engineer and signal corps,
has special sections on chemical warfare and psychological warfare as well as a
historical and archaeological section. In fact, all the new armies have taken an
active part in introducing specialized training schools and advanced techniques of
personnel management and procurement [Ref. 3:p. 77]. The military in these
developing countries has provided the primary impetus for modernization and
development, while also striving to create internal harmony.
Just as the military represents an industrialized organization, so must those who
have been trained within it learn skills and habits of mind which would be of value
in other industrial organizations.
In the West, armies in developed countries have played a very important role in
providing technical training and even direct services in the process of industrial
development. After World War II, the German Army trained large numbers of non-
commissioned officers who performed important functions in the German steel mills
and in other industries. In the United States Army Engineers played a central role
in the whole development of the West. After the Civil War, army veterans provided
considerable amounts of skills and knowledge which, when combined with the
influx of immigrants, provided a basis for much of its industrial development.
In Latin America, the Brazilian Army has played an important part in opening
the interior, in promoting the natural sciences, and in protecting the Indian
population. In Asia, too, we can see much the same story being enacted now.
Before the war the compulsory training in the Japanese Army provided the whole
society with increasing reservoirs of manpower which contributed directly to the
development of an industrial society. Army veterans in India have also played an
important role not only in low-level industrial jobs but also in managerial positions.
Finally in Malaysia and the Philippines the army has been the main instrument for
training people in operating and maintaining motor vehicles and other forms of
machinery. [Ref. 3:p. 82]
Politically the most significant feature of the process of acculturation within the
military is that it usually provides some form of training in citizenship. Recruits
with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they must
identify with a larger political self. They learn that they stand in some definite
relationship to a national community. In this sense the army experience tends to be
a politicizing experience [Ref. 3:p. 96]. Even if recruits are not given explicit
training in political matters, they are likely to learn that events in their society are
determined by human decisions and not just by chance and fate. Thus even aside
from any formal training in patriotism, the recruit is likely to achieve some
awareness of the political dimensions of his society. It is therefore not surprising
that in many of the newly emerging countries veterans have had appreciable
political influence even after only limited military experience.
IV. KOREA AND MILITARY
The current role of the military in every aspect of Korean society seems to be
far more influential than meets the eye. Given the military's size, to highly trained
manpower, and to sophisticated new weapon systems, the scope and magnitude of
influence of the Korean military can never be underestimated in figuring out what
has happened so far and what will happen in terms of national development of
Korea.
Many scholars have done research on the relationship between the military and
national development. Much has been argued for the positive as well as negative
roles of the military in developing countries. Korea is no exception in this sense.
Historically speaking, civilian orientation of Korean cultural tradition and traditional
Korea's Confucian culture were overwhelmingly dominant until 1961. Only
infrequently throughout Korean history had the armed forces played a major role,
although there were wars and revolutions led by men in uniform. Korean
Confucian societal hierarchy prohibited the armed forces from playing a truly
dominant role. This was true at least until 1961 when the Military Revolution took
place. The remainder of this chapter will review the Korean military tradition.
A. THE KOREAN MILITARY TRADITION BEFORE LIBERATION (1945)
Even though there were several military heroes who were successful in founding
dynasties after the Unified Silla in 676 A.D., the tradition of complete civilian
supremacy would never allow military interventions. Throughout most of Korean
history the military branch of the national bureaucracy was effectively degraded to
an inferior status. For example, every possible means were used to deter the
emergence of military heroes. It is well known that the military officers of the
central government in Koryo dynasty (918-1392), having been subjected to
extremely harsh and humiliating arrogance upon them by the civilian officials,
finally staged a bloody coup d'etat in 1170 A.D. [Ref. 4:p. 1].
During the Choson dynasty (1392-1910) founded by Yi, Song-Gye, the civilian
elite seemed to have worried about possible military involvement. The fear of
potential threat to the civilian supremacy was so great throughout the five centuries
of the Choson dynasty that the military officers failed to compel the ruling elite to
strengthen the military power necessary to defend the nation from the impending
menace of military aggression by the Hideyoshi Japan [Ref. 4:p. 2].
It is also well-known that one of Korea's few pre-eminent heroes. Admiral Yi,
Sun-Sin, who saved the country from the Japanese invasion in the fifteenth century,
was indicted on the charge of high treason even during the time of war. These
kinds of incidents happened frequently due to the ideology of civil-supremacy and
to the worst form of the factionalism among the elite.
The anti-militaristic tradition prevailed even after the bitter experience that
military weakness resulted only in dehumanization and destruction of basic human
rights. This was caused by the cruel foreign invaders such as the Mongol invasion
of the thirteenth century, the Japanese invasion of the fifteenth century, and
continued when Yi dynasty was annexed by Japan in 1910. However, the civil-
supremacist rulers could still argue against the necessity of maintaining a sizable
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standing army so long as the political survival of the nation itself was not in
jeopardy.
During the last Korean dynasty of Yi, the anti-military tradition seemed to have
been based on the ruling elite's fear of any other sources of power rather than on
the kind of political order the ruling elite preferred under the official Confucian
ideology which favored the civil-supremacy. Furthermore, Korea's Confucian
societal hierarchy prohibited armed forces from playing a truly dominant role and
the military had no choice but to obey civilian leadership. In this context, it seems
to have been very difficult for a military tradition to take shape.
After the Yi dynasty ended, Korea was colonized by Japan. During the
Japanese domination (1910-1945), the colonial rule exacerbated the feeling of anti-
militarism due to the atrocities of Japanese military. This experience made worse
the anti-military tradition of Chosun dynasty.
Ironically, the Japanese were instrumental in founding the current Korean
military. After the seizure of Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese began to train a
limited number of Koreans to serve as officers in the Japanese armed forces. In
1933, the Chinese Nationalist Government trained hundreds of Koreans in its
military schools under an agreement between the Provisional Government leader
Kim Ku and Chiang Kai-Shek. Many of these Korean officers, mostly the
Japanese-trained, played a major role in founding the Korean armed forces after the
liberation from Japan.
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B. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE KOREAN MILITARY
Japan's surrender was unexpected, and, consequently, liberation was followed by
much confusion. Adding to the confusion, Korea was divided both physically and
emotionally. The country was divided by the 38th parallel with the northern half
occupied by the Soviet Union and the southern half by the United States. The
Korean nation was not consulted at all in this decision. It was only the military
expedience of the occupying powers that imposed the tragic decision on Korea.
The American occupation forces took part in maintaining law and order after
receiving the Japanese surrender, and later of organizing the forthcoming Korean
armed forces. Right after the arrival of these forces, the Korean Constabulary was
activated with the assistance of American Military Government in Korea. It was
those Koreans who had served in the Japanese armed forces that formed the nucleus
of the Constabulary. Diverse backgrounds were the characteristic of the
Constabulary from the start.
The initial corps of Constabulary officers consisted of five different groups of
Japanese trained officers. Twenty graduates of the Imperial Defense College in
Tokyo who had served their World War JJ service as officers in the Japanese Army
were the elite among them. The forty-plus former Japanese Army officers trained
in the Manchurian Academy was the second best trained group. A third group was
the student officers, and a fourth group was composed of men who had volunteered
for Japanese service in 1938 without particular prior educational experience. The
fifth and the least prestigious group of Japanese Army veterans had served as
conscripts. [Ref. 5:pp. 336-337]
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In 1946, the Seoul English Language School, which had previously been
established for breaking down the language barrier between the U.S. advisors and
Koreans, became the Korean Constabulary Training Center for Constabulary officers.
On June 15, 1946, the Department of National Defense became the Department of
Internal Security. The Department contained the bureaus of Police and Armed
Forces. The Bureau of Armed Forces contained the bureaus of Constabulary and
the Coast Guard. The Korean Coast Guard was established on June 15, 1946. On
September 11, 1946, the Koreans became responsible for the administration of the
department with the American personnel assuming advisory status.
The United States Military Government in Korea ended when the Republic of
Korea was established on August 15, 1948. With the appearance of the new
Republic, the importance of a defense force increased. The Korean government
formed a Ministry of National Defense, while the Korean Constabulary was
reorganized as the Republic of Korea Army on September 5, 1948. On May 5,
1948, a small aviation unit was formed within the Korean Constabulary. This unit
was the nucleus of Korea's modem Air Force. Along with the two service
branches, the Marine Corps was established within the Navy. There were 94,974
men in the Army at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, compared with
6,956 in the Navy, 1,697 in the Air Force, and 1,166 in the Marine Corps [Ref.
6:pp. 32-33].
The new Republic of Korea possessed no organizations, resources, or technology
upon which to build such a large and powerful military. Consequently, the Korean
armed forces at this moment was in an infant stage, and naturally, the United States
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armed forces at this moment was in an infant stage, and naturally, the United States
played a great role in helping the rapid growth of the Korean military.
Korea, though, would have taken far more time to build such a large Armed
Forces if not for the Korean War. Hahm argues that the Korean Armed Forces
would have remained small and weak because of the lingering anti-military bias still
deeply rooted in the Korean psyche. He also claims that given the uncertain future
prospect for the new Republic in the context of the overwhelming national desire
for reunification, little need was perceived to devote scarce economic and human
resources to a military build-up. Economic poverty was severe, so was the shortage
of trained personnel. Having a powerful military was not a high priority for the
newly emerging country. [Ref. 4:p. 12]
During three years of war, with the assistance from the United States, the
Republic of Korea armed forces were expanded and improved in both quantity and
quality. By the middle of 1954, the Korean Armed Forces had grown to twenty
active Army divisions and ten reserve divisions, with a strengthened Navy, and an
Air Force equipped with jet planes.
C. GROWTH OF MILITARY POWER
As already indicated the Republic of Korea suffered the traumas of an infant
republic when it was founded on August 1948. A new government was established
for 20 million people with little resources at its disposal. Also, the limited number
of developmental resources left behind by Japan were destroyed during the Korean
War. Independence was, however, welcome and euphoria was generated for a
promising future.
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The government of the First Republic was, however, overthrown by a massive
student uprising in April, 1960. The immediate cause of the uprising was a rigged
election in March of that year with President Rhee of the First Republic and his
Liberal Party attempting to stay in power. The student uprisings were spontaneous
at the outset, but the public soon joined them. The Rhee regime had been suffering
from much negative criticism from the citizens. The general public believed that
President Rhee was too old and had been in power too long, that there were too
much corruption in government, that the economy had been suffering from
stagnation and depression, and that there were too many profiteers in and out of
government [Ref. 7:pp. 83-92].
In July, 1960, two months after the downfall of the Rhee regime caused by the
student demonstration, a free election took place and the Democratic Party won an
overwhelming majority. However, even after the election, political instability
continued. The Second Republic of the Democratic Party was not strong
enough to carry out the democratic process. It also lacked political leadership. On
May 16, 1961, a small group of Korea's powerful Armed Forces seized power in an
almost bloodless revolution, uprooting the uncertain democratic experiment of the
Second Republic.
The revolution took place on the 16th of May, and the next day, the military of
30 men, comprised primarily of generals and colonels headed by General Park
Chung Hee, took charge of national affairs. The same day this Revolutionary
Committee announced their public pledges for revolution. The Committee's plan
emphasized a stronger anti-communist stand and contained a strong pledge to
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eradicate all corruption and social evils. Furthermore, the Committee promised to
rejuvenate the demoralized national spirit and to concentrate their efforts to establish
a self-supporting economy.
There are a number of scholars who agree that the military revolution was
welcomed by the majority of Koreans even though there is not much empirical data
available to support that statement. For example, Chai described a great sense of
relief among the people when the military took over the corrupt and inefficient
government [Ref. 6:p. 36]. Kim said that the military assumption of power in 1961
was welcomed by the people at the outset as a surgical device to remedy the ills of
the country [Ref. 7:pp. 83-92].
When the military succeeded in the revolution and assumed power, the military
pledged their revolutionary mission of political change, economic growth, and social
reform. General Park, as the leader of the Junta, became the standard bearer of the
junta-created Democratic Republican Party and ran successfully for president of the
Third Republic Many in the junta and other military personnel took off their
uniforms and ran for the national assembly or served in the Government. The 1961
revolution brought the military into the main stream of Korean politics and national
development.
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V. SOCIETAL ROLE OF THE KOREAN MILITARY
A. THE MILITARY AS A MODERN INSTITUTION
At the outbreak of the Korean War, the size of the Korean military was about
100,000 men. However, the ROK Army was deficient of necessary weapons to stop
the North Korean attack. It lacked both an armored tank force and any significant
anti-tank weaponry. Its Navy and Air Force were practically non-existent. The
Korean War, however, transformed the American perception of security in East
Asia. Korea was then included within the defense perimeter of the United States,
and Washington started investing in Korean defense. During the war, and soon
thereafter, the size of the Korean military was increased several fold to some
600,000 men.
As a part of its war effort, the United States allocated vast resources to the
training and education of the Korean military, especially its officer corps. During
the war itself, the fighting capabilities of the Korean military had to be improved
and modem techniques of planning and management had to be learned. In the
period following the armistice, a large number of Korean officers were sent to the
United States to receive training and acquire managerial and administrative skills.
In terms of sheer magnitude of money, manhours, and intellectual investment, the
military share of education and training received from America far outweighed those
received by the civilian sector of the nation. The transfer of technology, weapons,
logistic support, and financial aid for the development of a strong Korean military
immediately followed. Thus, the Korean military became the most modernized
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segment of the nation. As Lucian Pye, among others, has maintained, the military
in the context of third world development is the most modem and easily created
organization [Ref. 3:p. 105].
In the context of development, the Korean military stood as the most modem
institution. Its enormous size in Korea, dictated by cold war considerations and
maintained by American aid, has made it the most powerful and best organized
group within Korean society. Through its conscription and recruitment practices, it
is in contact with the people at the grass roots level. Men from every village are
drafted into the military service, then discharged back into the society at the rate of
200,000 per year. During their stay in the military, men learn to handle and
operate modem equipment, to drive vehicles, and to relate in new ways to new
forms of organization. Furthermore, they come into contact with urban life. They
also become geographically mobile.
During this period, the Korean military has not only strengthened its military
power for national security but enhanced its role in modernizing Korean society in
such a manner that the military contributes personnel, equipment, oil, rice, cement,
tents, wood and bus services in the areas of construction, education, agriculture,
health and social welfare.
B. THE MILITARY AS A NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
Among other contributions, more apparent and conventional in nature, made by
the military to Korea's nation-building is the function of military as a school for
young people.
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By bringing young men from every section of the country into an organized
group, the military conscription has rendered a valuable service for national
integration. Sectionalism, dating all the way back to the Three Kingdoms period
prior to the unification by Silla (676 A.D), has bedeviled the nation throughout its
history. This sectionalism would certainly have been far more destructive had it not
been tempered by the experience of young recruits sharing the nationally organized
disciplined life together with those who came from various parts of the country. In
this sense, the military was truly a national body, representing the entire nation.
[Ref. 4:p. 12]
The Korean military has effectively performed its educational function. Travel,
made possible by the military service, has itself been a best form of living
education. It enabled the youths to see various parts of the country which most of
them would not have had the opportunity of seeing on their own. Their travel
experience, thus gained during their military service, immeasurably enhanced their
mobility in their subsequent civilian life. In the early days of the Republic, even
literacy was one of the major benefits of military service. Later on, vocational
training has become much more important. Everyone was required to master at
least one skill during his service. The rapid development of Korean economy
would not have been feasible without the technical training provided by the military.
A farm boy from a remote comer of the country not only learned to drive a
motor vehicle, maintain a machine, repair an engine, operate a radio, but also
became conscious of his ability to shape and condition his productive environment.
A man-made horticultural environment, for example, could be created by using
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inexpensive transparent vinyl sheets. By maintaining certain level of temperature,
moisture, light and soil fertility, such vegetables and berries as previously could
only be enjoyed in summer could be produced in bitterly cold winter. A man who
had before submitted himself helplessly to the whims of nature now begins to make
his own climate to suit his own production schedule. Thermometer, soil analysis
kit, humidifier, drier, sensitive and accurate scale, and timing devices, in short, the
instruments of science, now become indispensable implements of farming just as
hoes, sickles and ploughs have been traditionally. [Ref. 4:p. 13]
Experience of travel by motor vehicles enables a young farmer to be conscious
of distance to the market for his produce. Distance is increasingly measured by
time it takes to reach a destination by various modern means of transportation rather
than in terms of kilometers, because the freshness of his delicate out-of season
produce is a critical factor in obtaining a highest possible price for it. [Ref. 4:p. 14]
A significant portion of these farm youths has decided to settle in the cities,
using their newly acquired skills to earn a living. This phenomenon has clearly
aggravated the problem of overcrowding in the cities. Although the inability of city
governments to provide minimally adequate services to the accelerating influx of
new inhabitants has appeared to worsen as time passed, the possession of
industrially useful skills by the ex-servicemen has greatly mitigated the sort of
social and political difficulty caused in other Third World countries by the migration
of the dispossessed rural poor to the urban centers.
In the Korean context, it has been the pull exerted by the rapidly growing
industrial sector which has attracted those youths who possessed necessary skills
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rather than the rural area expelling the unemployable surplus labor without
industrially usable skills. [Ref. 4:p. 15]
The Saemaul Movement (Korea's rural development plan) would have been just
another example of many failures experienced by developing countries but for the
new leadership provided by those young farmers whose exposure to the military life
gave them a new perspective on farm life. They were not only technologically
innovative, but commercially oriented also. Their farming activities were dictated
by the vicissitude of urban markets rather than by the force of tradition or age-old
habit. As the government's programs of rural electrification and road construction
coincided with the agrarian cultural revolution led by the young leadership, Korea's
economic development could gain a sustained momentum [Ref. 4:p. 17].
The educational impact of the military is especially noteworthy. Particularly in
the early years of the Republic, the military served as the largest primary
educational institution for those young recruits without any formal schooling.
Because of its size, particularly in the case of Korea, the military also constitutes a
state within the state in its administrative structures. Men are trained to fill the
various administrative and managerial posts with the military institutions. The
military also maintains a variety of training institutes, training officers and enlisted
men through various courses. According to one account, there were at one time
110 and 227 different courses dealing with various fields of knowledge and skills
respectively for officers and enlisted men [Ref. 4:p. 19]. The military training has
provided both a pool of trained people whose talents are available for public and
private organizations.
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C. MILITARY ELITE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Since the 1961 military revolution, the country has indeed made remarkable
strides in modem development, more impressive than most other newly-emerging
nations.
The tables in the Appendix show that Korea has achieved an impressive record
of development and has improved the standard of living of the average citizen much
more quickly than most other third world countries. Korea's average annual growth
rate of GNP per capita in 1960-1978 was 6.9 percent, a remarkable record of
growth. In the process, Korea has been able to transform itself from an
underdeveloped agrarian society to a rapidly industrializing country [Ref. 8:p. 266].
The overall rise in the standard of living of the people is also shown by the
quality of life indicators. The life expectancy at birth has considerably increased,
from 54 in 1978 to 63 in 1960, and the child death rate for the age group of one
to four years declined considerably from 13 percent to 5 percent in the same period.
The population per physician indicators also show that the situation in 1977 (1960
persons per physician) was better than in 1960 (3000 per physician) [Ref. 8:p. 267].
How did the Korean military elite manage to put the Korean economy on the
track to the great success it has achieved in the intervening years? There are a
variety of documents that describe the negative side of a military's ability to
stimulate economic development. Janowitz believes that militaries do not have
appropriate skills and training, nor adequate goals to carry out economic
development [Ref. 9:p. 129]. On the contrary, the Korean military regime has
shown considerable political skill and a remarkable ability for solving challenging
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economic problems. They did it by being pragmatic and using the best available
resources to them. The military-backed elite under President Park, having
recognized the shortcoming that they did not have adequate economic skills for the
huge task at hand, became active partners with economic experts who would resolve
economic problems, and assigned themselves tasks they could manage [Ref. 10:p.
97].
There were three essential tasks assumed by the elite: rebuilding a national
commitment to succeed, helping to create the societal and material infrastructure so
necessary to economic success, and maintaining the security necessary to enable
everything else to proceed in safety. [Ref. 10:pp. 95-98]
The military-backed elite worked strenuously with civilian society toward
creating the national esprit needed to rebuild the values of Korea's past. From the
mid-1960s the elite stressed a variation of Korea's traditional Confucian virtues:
diligence, frugality, and group identity. The military-backed elite succeeded in
rebuilding Korea's ethic to succeed. An esprit, a drive, was infused in Korean
society that was not evident before President Park initiated his campaign combining
moral rearmament with ethnic pride. The military also played an important role in
bolstering the material infrastructure of the state. Armed forces generally are seen
as a drag on the economy of the state that sustains them, which in a certain sense
is true. However, there is another side to that story. Armed forces can play a
positive economic role, especially in developing countries [Ref. 10:pp. 95-98]. In
the case of Korea, the armed forces initially played an important economic role by
helping to construct facilities such as railroads, roads and bridges, etc., which
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contributed to the economic well-being of the country. Perhaps even more
important than the concrete artifacts they produced were the training and confidence
the Korean armed forces gained from completing these project.
Given the large numbers who have passed through the Korean armed forces,
many relatively skilled civilian workers have emerged from the uniformed ranks to
help the Korean economy grow and prosper. Still more important are the number
of retired high-ranking officers who have become economic entrepreneurs. They
adapted the technical and administrative skills they learned in uniform to the private
sector. These contributions of the military and the ex-military to Korea's material
infrastructure are quite important to Korea's economic well-being.
Finally, there can be no doubt that all the Korean armed forces have done their
duties well in protecting Korea from the dangers of a second North Korean attack.
Despite North Korea's proximity and warlike spirit, the Korean armed forces have
provided an atmosphere of stability sufficient to warrant solid foreign business
confidence in the security of their trade and investments. That is a very significant
achievement, one to which the healthy Korean economy owes a great debt.
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VI. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CIVILIAN AREA
The Korean military has also had a significant impact on the civilian sector.
The military has been involved in activities such as agriculture, construction, public
education, public health, and the like which fall outside the primary mission of the
armed forces. Korean military men have assisted farmers in rice planting and
harvesting; they have built dams, roads, and schools; they have distributed food,
medical supplies, machines and equipment to needy civilians; and they have
entertained and educated villagers and provided them with medical treatment.
Military units at times have also established fraternal relationships with civilian
communities and schools and have organized civilian youth groups.
A. CIVIC SUPPORT
The civic support of the Army engineer corps centers around road construction,
building, and restoration work Its superior capability and confidence in these areas
were fully demonstrated by the results of Road Development Project. Up until 1967
it has completed 625.0 Km of road pavement, 356.0 Km of road expansion, and ten
bridge construction projects, providing 1,700,894 men and 343,184 pieces of
equipments per year. It also has completed construction on the most dangerous
and difficult parts of the 31.1 km highway between Seoul and Busan, which was
almost given up by the civilian company [Ref. ll:p. 731
.
Back in 1959, with the support of the United States Operating Mission
(USCOM), Korean and U.S. Armed Forces jointly were involved in ROK & US
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Joint Highway Project. This project linked strategically critical points and
contributed to the economic and industrial development of the government. Until
1970, a total of 693.3 Km of road construction was successfully completed [Ref.
ll:p. 79].
Activities were not limited to Korean highway projects. Between November
1965 and December 1967, the engineer corps was actively involved in civic support
action in Vietnam In this period, 1,110 Km of road and 719 bridges were
constructed or repaired using 189,865 military personnel and 29,063 pieces of
equipment [Ref. ll:p. 90].
The Air Force and the Army Aviation have also been active in civic support,
making significant contribution to life saving operations in times of flood, fire,
traffic accidents, and mine accidents. Between 1958 and 1981, Air Force and Army
Aviation completed 305 search and rescue missions, rescuing 3,691 people due to
various disasters. During this period they also have provided transportation over
8,000 times for VIP transport and 1,380 times for remote place transport [Ref. 1 1 :p.
91].
The Navy also has played an active part in saving victims of sea disasters along
Korean coasts and has been active in the marine resource excavation program which
requires highly advanced and technical military assistance. In the sea disaster
rescue operations, the Navy has saved 658 ships and 4,769 people as of 1980. In
the excavation operations of relics in the seabed, the Navy has picked up over
14,000 pieces of precious national treasurs from the sea [Ref. ll:p. 91]. On the sea
transportation side, the navy is also quite active in transportation of resources and
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manpower to various location. In 1969, the Navy implemented the Remote Island
public Relation Program. Under this program, benefits and services such as medical
treatments, movies, photograph shows, and invitations of remote island children to
Seoul were provided to local residents
B. TECHNICAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AREA
Korean armies are equipped with new weapons and machineries. Consequently,
their enlisted men and officers have to acquire the new skills of machine operation
and advanced techniques in maintenance. These skills and techniques generally do
not exist in civilian communities.
The Korean military is equipped with modern and advanced weapons and
allocates vast resources to training, education, and technological development. Such
functions are normally performed by the military technology institutions. Korean
military technology institutions, patterned after those of their American counterparts,
were founded immediately after establishment of the Korean Armed Forces. In this
early period schools with various specialties and technologies such as combat
intelligence and communications were organized. The military special and technical
schools established by June 1949 were the Combat Intelligence School, Signal
School, Engineer School, Artillery School, Ordinance School, Military Police School,
and Band School. Later, the Quartermaster School, Medical School, Finance
School, Infantry School and Command and General Staff College were added.
During 1951 and 1952, the Adjutant General School and Armor School were
established. By 1962, new schools such as the Women's Army Corps School,
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Army Nurses School, Chemical School, Army Aviation School and Logistics School
were established.
The more industrialized Korean society becomes, the more trained personnel it
needs. Moreover, most of the MOS's (Military Occupational Specialties) in the
Navy and Air Force such as aviation, meteorology, navigation, and electronic
equipment maintenance can directly be transferred into society which lacks the
schools and institutions to teach these specialized skills.
The Korean army, which obtains necessary training and education through
systematic 221 MOS in 16 schools as of 1981, maintains close relationships with
the civic sector and plays an important role in industrialization. Each school has
trained young men in various technical areas. Everyone was required to master at
least one skill during his service. Technological training provided by the
military technology institutions is quite impressive Between 1961 and 1975, over
one million young people were trained while they were in the military in the highly
specialized areas of machinery, construction, communication, electricity, electronics,
physics, chemistry, transportation, navigation, aviation and meteorology. Efforts to
develop further specialized technicians were made in vehicle maintenance, ordinance
maintenance, compressor machine, mechanical machine, airplane maintenance, and
special weapon repairs.
From 1975 to 1980, some 512,260 military personnel were successful candidates
of the National Technical Qualification Examination. During the same period, the
portion of licensed technicians who acquired qualification during military service
reached 18% of total licensed technicians in automobile repairs and maintenance
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field, 25% in hazardous material handling, and 14% of electricity technicians [Ref.
ll:p. 125].
To aid former soldiers in using their newly obtained skills in the civilian job
market, the military has conducted the Vocational Guiding Education Program. This
program was designed to provide necessary manpower required for the Second Five
Year Economic Development Plan which had been promoted on a national scale
since July 1967. Between 1969 and 1980, over 8,000 retiring soldiers benefited
from this program [Ref. ll:p. 131]. These retired soldiers learned various kinds of
skills and techniques such as heavy machine operation and maintenance, pipe laying,
welding, vehicle maintenance, accounting and bookkeeping.
As described so far, it is clear that in Korean society the military is an
important instrument for youth socialization and a significant agency for future
technical manpower. It is true that, according to Mr. Kwon Doo-Young, the
military has a great advantage in teaching skills and techniques for the following
reasons.
First, most of the enlisted men are the right age for vocational training.
Secondly, it is relatively easy to teach them to use modem equipment because they
must soon use these equipments as part of their jobs. Finally, this training can be
done with comparatively small expense using the existing organizational structure
and equipment. [Ref. 12:p. 252]
As both the military and society move toward modernization, it is possible that
the skills required by the military will overlap with those needed in the
technological society more than ever.
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C. MEDICAL SCIENCE AREA
Numerous medical officers and nurses were trained during the Korean War.
Since 1952, the military also has aggressively promoted both domestic and foreign
education in order to develop medical specialists capable of performing in such
medical areas as military surgery, dentistry, nursing and medical administration. It
is no doubt that returning to the civic sector after conscription, these trained
professionals have been utilized to satisfy manpower demands in the civic sector.
One of the military's biggest contributions in the medical science area includes
progressive research and development activities and the accumulation of medical
skills. Neuro-Surgery in Korea was in a rudimentary stage, but it began rapidly to
develop when the First Neuro-Surgery Team was founded in March, 1952
Afterwards the Third Army General Hospital was designated as Neuro-Surgical
Treatment Center and began to conduct specialized treatment. Many medical
officers were trained in the United States and O.J.T. for the treatment of Neuro-
surgical patients
The E.H.F.(Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever), a disease generated first in Korea
during the Korean War, appeared in the field army area and spread into the whole
country in the 1970s. To cope with the disease, the military established and
operated the First E.H.F. Research Institute and Treatment Center. This center with
the cooperation of the college hospital made significant progress in the study of
E.H.F. [Ref. Il:p.l40].
The ocean and Underwater Medical Research Center was founded to solve the
medical problems related to diving and to study the prevention of diving accidents.
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It is a unique facility dedicated to the study of ocean and underwater medicine in
Korea.
The Aeromedical Research Center, established in 1952, is the only institute to
conduct a study on aeromedical science and aero-staffs' health treatment. The
center has published a scholarly journal Aeromedical Science from 1952 and has
published over 500 articles. For study and training, it has many training devices
such as a lower pressure chamber, and a human centrifuge which are the only ones
in Korea. The center conducts physical tests and health examinations for all civilian
pilots and crewmen. [Ref. ll:p. 140] For the first time in Korea, Armed Forces
Nursing Academy conducted aerospace and diving nursing education. The military
also established the Medical Equipment Corps which is a unique training institute in
Korea, and also the military is the first institution in Korea to produce artificial
limbs and eyes.
As described so far. it is clear that the Korean Military has made significant
contributions to the development of medical science and medical capabilities in
connection with the civilian sector.
D. GENERAL MANPOWER PRODUCTION AREA
As of 1981, the Korean military has produced so far a huge labor force totalling
3,942,013 veterans, including 425 generals, 803 full colonels and 180,911 skilled air
personnel and 316,029 naval personnel [Ref. ll:p. 154]. During the 1960s and
1970s, Korea has made enormous effons to bolster its economic development
through its four Five-Year Economic Development Plans which require both skilled
and manual workers who are available from the ranks of retired veterans.
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The military forces have also provided educational service to civilians including
public officers, police, national defense members, military instructors, and general
college students. In return selected military officers were sent to civilian
universities to gain knowledge about social sciences and natural sciences to enhance
overall quality of the officers corps. The scope of education of the armed forces
was not limited at home. Numerous officers went abroad to study advanced
management technique and various technical subjects.
The armed forces have been effective in the field of enhancement of language
skills and development of administrative and management capabilities. Language
skills in English, Vietnamese, Malaysian, Thai, German, Chinese, Russian, and
Japanese have been actively cultivated for the purpose of translation and
interpretation. Benefit of language education offered in the military have also been
extended to the civilian sector where specialized knowledge in language is
demanded. The number of interpreters in active service increased dramatically after
the establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command and the initiation of
ROK-US combined military exercises.
To develop administrative manpower training in general administration, personnel
administration, manpower management, officers attended training programs in Korea
and abroad. Curricula in accounting, management, leadership, and planning were
also offered to generate skilled personnel among the ranks. Frequent foreign
inspections and foreign official trips were executed to enhance and widen officers'
knowledge and experience. These elaborate efforts exerted to develop high-quality
manpower can be seen in the occupational distribution of retired high ranking
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officers. Taking the leading part in each area, they are spread throughout




During the last thirty years, Korean society has experienced a significant increase
in the role, influence, responsibility, and expertise of the military. The role and
contribution of the military has been extensive for the nation-building of the newly
independent country, the maintenance of national security, economic and social
development, and the cultivation of nationalism and national spirit. Clearly the
Korean military services have contributed immeasurably to the modernization and
development of the nation.
The Korean military managed to put the Korean economy on track by being
pragmatic and confident and by working hard. The military elite worked strenuously
toward creating the national esprit and rebuilding the values of Korea's past. And
they were successful. The military also played an important role by producing for
the private sector skilled and experienced former military personnel.
The Korean military has also been effective in performing its educational
function. By bringing young men from every section of the country into an
organized group, military conscription has rendered a valuable service for national
integration. It also played a significant role in maintaining the country's conservative
political wing and acting as an ideological stabilizer.
Furthermore, the Korean military has conducted various types of technological
and medical research, compensating for the lack of and weakness in comparable
civilian research institutions. Other areas of service provided by the military include
the direct aid to the civilian community through construction projects and disaster
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relief operations. The military as a modem organization and modernizing agent has
been successful in contributing to strengthening essential administrative functions
and raising standards in public administration.
While the military contributed to the civilian sector providing both a trained
labor force and administrative technology, it has also established reserve forces
with over a million veterans whose main strategic function is to mobilize forces for
active combat against infiltrating North Korean guerrillas. The greatest contribution,
however, has been that which is a common mission to all military services
throughout the world: national security. There can be no doubt that all the Korean
Armed Forces have done their duty to successfully protect Korea from the danger of
war. The military has provided an atmosphere of stability and a military shield
behind which the sound and healthy economy is possible.
The Korean military has grown in its own organizational strength by a complex
mixture of social practice, norms, and interactions. It is natural that the military's
future strength depends on its own combat capability and also on associated civilian
support and understanding and communication.
Even though the military is composed of all strata of society and contains the
same ideology and values as the civilian population, there still exists a
communication and understanding gap between the military and civilian population.
Civilians think the military is too conservative, rigid and authoritative. They also
have tendency to think that the military is not keeping up with changes in the
times. On the other hand, the military thinks that civilians do not fully understand
the current situation of national security and that they misunderstand the roles of the
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Korean military. This gap is not, however, the result of disapproval of each other
or an attitude of indifference, but rather it is the result of differing interests
pursuing the same national goal: peace, freedom, and prosperity.
In order to decrease this gap and enhance mutual understanding, the military
must take an active effort to improve public relations by increasing civilian
awareness of what the military does in Korea and explaining how it supports
civilian population activities. These efforts can be accomplished through effective
use of mass media campaign which would provide the public with more knowledge
of what the military does. The military also must be active in providing the public
with more opportunities to see and understand the military, such as encouraging
close relations with the civilian sector through the establishment of sisterhood
relationships with civilian sectors, opening the military bases and activities within
bases to the public to reduce barriers between the two groups. Furthermore,
getting more involved in social activities such as sports, cultural festivals, and
academic fields would also be a good way for the military to enhance the mutual
understanding.
In Korea, the military and the society share common goals and aspirations. In
this context, we must stress greater professionalism by the military, thus raising the
general level of its capability while also striving to foster better communication with
the civilian sector. By doing so, the military will be able to be a more professional
and capable institution armed with greater responsibility and maturity.
The future contribution of the military to Korea's national development will
greatly depend upon its ability to recognize the limitation of every profession,
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especially its own, and to secure cooperation with specialists and experts in other
fields to take fullest advantage of their divergent experience and wisdom for the
purpose of accelerating the development of this country.
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APPENDIX A
IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE MILITARY TAKEOVER
Problem
Area
Image of the Past
(Under Civilian Rule)
Image of the Future (To Be


































cliques feuding with one
another and pursuing
their own self-interest
under the guise of
democracy.
Those in power committed
to self-aggrandisement,
profiteering at the expense
of the people.
Rulers incapable as well as
irresponsible.
Self-sufficient economy
providing for the welfare of all,
attained through planning,
emphasis on primary industry,
expanded base of trade.
Prevalence of modern ideas;
achievement-oriented society.
Cultivation of a new morality,
based upon austerity.




Those in power committed
selflessly building the nation
and promotting the welfare of the
people.
Rulers wise and efficient.
APPENDIX B
QUALITY OF' LIFE INDICATORS
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1960 71 68 39
Rate 1975 93 84 62(in Percentage)
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 19 80
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II. URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
Description Year Korea Thailand Indonesia
Urban Population 1960 28 13 15













































1960 41 41 32
1978 40 46 36
Value Added in
Manufacturing 1970 1 431 1,048 854














Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981
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APPENDIX C
THE ADVANCEMENT OF MILITARY ELITES
I. HIGH GOVERNMENT POSTS (19 48-19 75)
^s. Period
Pre-Military Military Rule Post-Military
\. (1948.8-1961.5) (1961.5-1963.12) (1963.12-1975.8)
Post \.
Total Mil(%) Total Mil(%) Total Mil(%)
Premier 7 1(14.3) 3 2(66.7) 4 2(50.0)
Cabinet Minister 152 11(7.2) 49 27(55.1) 120 42(35.0)
Provincial
Governor
110 - 17 11(64.7) 56 18(32.1)
House Speaker 39 - - - 18 6(33.3)
Source: Data collected by C.I. Eugene Kim and John P. Lovell, Government Elites
of the Republic of Korea, 1948-1979
II. EMPLOYMENT OF RETIRED GENERALS (As of 19 76
Position Number
National Assembly, member 36
Government Post, non-diplomatic, high rank 53
Diplomatic post 17
Public Enterprise, manager or staff member 76
Private Enterprise, manager or staff member 169
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II. RESULTS OF CIVIC ACTION (ARMY)
A. Land Development (196 8)


















Woodland 268 Jungbo 68,806 1,009
Wasteland 149 " 710 450
Cultivation
River 133 " 3,060 300
Hill 31 " 9,681 263
Farmland 1,475 " 14,513 2,957
Gumi District - 8,426 2,025
Channel Const. Cutting 65m 69,017 2,555
Others Riverside Work 1,230 EA 38
19
School Site
Work 12,000Pyung 3,287 2,622
Source : Handbook of Army Civic Support Action (1968)
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B. Disaster Restoration (During 1962-1967)
Field Results Equipment Supplied
Road Repair 42,376 m Buldozer: 6,490EA Crane: 2EA
Banking 35,862 m Trk Dump: 17,039EA Cargo: 27,555EA
Water-
Pumping 570 EA
Motor Fire Engine: 3 3EA Pump: 1,850EA
Compressor: 58EA Trailer: 6,852EA
Agriculture 947 Jungbo
Grader : 185EA Water Pump : 7,618EA
Water-Supply 940 (10k GA)
Others : 40,146EA
Total Mil. Personnel : 1,424 186 Total Supplied Equip.: 107,837 EA
Source: Handbook of Army Civic Support Action (1968)
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III. RQK. £ US JOINT HIGHWAY PROJECT
A. Objective
(1) Strengthen the belt between civilian and army.
(2) Contribute to the economical and industrial development of
government
(3) Acquire mobile route
B. Background and source
(1) Background
a. Approached to the agreement to plan and perform
mutually the road development project in Korea
with the support of USOM in 1959.
b. The initial ROK-US joint highway project EROX
Uijongbu to Woonchon was started in 1962.
c. The joint highway committee was activated as of
1 July 1962. For the effective support of the ROK-
US joint highway project. According to the US civic
action program for the under-developed nation, which
was proposed by president Kennedy in 1962.
d. ROK Ministry of national defense became a member upon
probe vine the support responsibility of some part
of local material in 1966.
(2) Source
Source of this project, which was replaced recently
is as follows; EUSA Policy instruction 5-11(3. July 1968)
and civic support plan regulation 530-8 (3 Dec. 1968)
Source : Office of the Chife of Engineers
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IV. THE RESULTS OF CIVIC SUPPORT ACTION
DURING VIETNAM WAR (1965-1967)
Description Result Mil. Personnel Equipment
Road Construction 254 Km 60,101 7,383
Road Repair 784 Km 81,312 14,101
Road Pavement 72 Km 15,734 4,190
Bridge Const. 719 EA 31,918 3,389
Source : Annual Reports of Engineers























Source : Army Aviation School Headquarters of Air Force Brigade
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VI. NAVAL CIVIC ACTION PLAN
A. Rescue of Sea Disaster
\. Des. East Sea West Sea South Sea Total
Year >. Ship Per. Ship Per. Ship Per. Ship Per.
1969 29 - 22 - 6 - 57
1970 22 - 21 - 8 - 51
1971 26 - 24 - 11 - 61
1972 42 459 21 262 13 144 80 865
1973 15 171 10 59 1 - 26 230
1974 7 67 13 44 3 174 23 285
1975 20 114 13 72 3 2 36 188
1976 84 869 20 91 74 438 178 1,398
1980 2 54 1 30 9 102 12 186
B. Excavation of Relics in the Seabed
Year Term Relics
1976 Nov. 9 - Dec. 3 1,966
1977 Jun. 7 - Jul. 31 4,906
1978 Jun.18 - Aug. 9 5,046
1979 May 29 - Jul. 21 489
1980 Jun. 5 - Aun. 3 94 2
Source: Headquarters of Navy, Personnel Staff
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APPENDIX E
TECHNICAL MANPOWER AND DEVELOPMENT AREA
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I . STATUS ON EDUCATION AND TREATMENT
(OCEAN AND UNDERWATER MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER)























Source : Ocean and Underwater Medical Research Center
II. ACOMPLISHMENT OF EDUCATION
(THE AEROMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER)




34 46 72 71 66 51 871
Aeronurce
Officers 10
- - 20 20 10 10 70
Civilian
Pilots 1,578
71 70 317 - - 267 2,407
Others 37 - - - 5C 29 124
Source : The Aeromedical Research Center
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III. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE TRAINING














































Total 76 166 1,116 80
* Medical Equipment Maintenance Units is the unique training institute




I. MASTER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE EDUCATION
J""\Des. English Malay German Chinese Russian Japanese Total
1953 326 - - - - - 326
1954 258 - - — - - 258
1955 302 - - - - - 302
1956 439 - - - - - 439
1957 344 - - - - - 344
1958 547 - - - - - 547
1959 290 - - - - - 290
1960 679 - - 8 6 - 693
1961 494 - - 13 11 - 518
19G2 415 - - 11 9 - 435
1963 498 - - 8 10 - 516
1964 550 - 10 10 10 - 580
1965 567 - 10 9 5 - 591
1966 407 - 9 9 5 - 430
1967 395 - 15 15 5 - 430
1968 528 - 5 14 4 10 561
1969 254 - 5 12 5 10 413
1970 434 19 9 10 4 10 700
1971 554 10 3 10 5 10 732
1972 533 - - 5 - 5 599
1973 394 - - 10 - 10 414
1974 181 - - 10 - 10 201
1975 223 - - - - - 223
Total 9,612 29 66 154 79 65 10 ,542
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